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Abstract 
We assess the unemployment duration-dependent impact of the 2008 Labor Contract Law on job 
finding probabilities and subsequently job-match quality, including job security, wages and 
employer-provided social insurance. Dynamic endogeneity underlying individuals’ sequential 
labor market outcomes is addressed by sharp regression discontinuity and correlated individual 
unobservables settling into non-parametric joint distribution. The law protracts employment only 
in the short-term. After job match, the law stabilizes employment and increases wages and 
insurance coverage, all in the short-term with substantial differences between urban locals and 
migrant workers and heterogeneity in gender. 
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Unemployment Duration and Job-Match Quality in Urban China:  
The Dynamic Impact of 2008 Labor Contract Law 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The socialist system in 1980s and 90s labor markets in urban China privileged urban 
residents (those with urban household registration, Hukou) by assigning permanent jobs in 
state or collective sectors and prohibiting job mobility. Consequently, this is referred to as 
the “iron rice bowl” period. To limit inefficiency caused by de facto lifetime jobs, a labor 
law permitting short-term contracts, regulation of employment relations and minimum 
working conditions took effect in 1995 together with the restructuring of the state and 
collective sectors. Between 1995 and 2000, 31.6 million and 16.5 million workers were 
laid off from the state and collective sectors, respectively, equaling a quarter of the 1995 
urban labor force.1 Draconian labor retrenchment caused unemployment of an average 19 
months suppressing wages by 16% for this unemployment period, especially for women 
(Knight and Li, 2006). Urban labor markets also became less formalized as it was 
common for employers to re-hire the laid-off workers on an informal basis (Cai et al., 
2008). According to Friedman and Lee (2010), only half of enterprises signed contracts 
with employees by 2007 and this proportion was much lower for non-state sectors (20%) 
and migrant workers (12.5%). The low contract rate, especially in the non-state sectors 
(less than 20%), together with the fact that more than 60% of contracts were short-term 
(less than one year), were also reflected in a survey of 31,000 employees across 7 
provinces, both of which were conducted by the National People’s Congress of China in 
                                               
1 Authors’ calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2001 published by the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS). 
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April 2005.2 Meanwhile, rural-to-urban migrant workers rarely had social insurance. In Lu 
and Song’s (2006) survey in Tianjin which is only about 100km from the capital city, few 
migrants had medical insurance (14.3%), pension (8.6%) or unemployment insurance 
(7.3%) in contrast with high insurance coverage among urban workers – 68.2%, 63.8% 
and 51.8%. Consequently, loss of formalization and limited protection of workers have 
become salient in urban labor markets (Park and Cai, 2011). 
The Chinese government enforced the new Labor Contract Law (LCL) from January 
1st, 2008 to halt the trend of informalisation of the urban labor market (Gallagher et al., 
2013). Policy was to institutionalize labor conflict resolution and ease labor relations 
(Gallagher and Dong, 2011) through legislation and arbitration (Friedman and Lee, 2010). 
There are two primary goals underlying the passage of the law: to protect workers’ rights 
by mandating labor contracts and by regulating the contract amendment, conversion and 
termination. This causes Chinese employment protection legislation (EPL) to be the 3rd 
strictest among the OECD countries (Gallagher et al., 2013). Secondly, the LCL dedicates 
to improving employees’ social protection. As reviewed by Freeman (2010), EPL for 
developed (typically OECD) countries has tilted market outcomes towards incumbent 
workers without a clear aggregate influence on employment, while the impact in 
developing countries remains ambiguous and highly sensitive to country-specific contexts 
(e.g., the tightness of labor markets and strength/enforcement of EPL). Using the 2008 
EPL in China, this paper aims to offer a dynamic and causal assessment of the 
implementation of LCL on workers’ unemployment duration dependent labor market 
outcomes in terms of their job-finding rates and the subsequent job-match quality 
including job security, wages and the likelihood of obtaining employer-provided social 
insurance.  
                                               
2  The report is accessible at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/2005-12/29/content_343899.htm (in Chinese, 
accessed 29 January 2016).  
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2. Review of new Labor Contract Law and its consequences in urban labor markets 
For appointments after January 1st, 2008, the articles of LCL relating to the first primary 
goal include: mandatory contracts for all kinds of labor; specified probationary periods of 
1 to 6 months according to the length of the contract and entitlement to a single 
probationary period from the same employer. This restriction is intended to prevent 
employers exploiting workers by extending probation(s) and then terminating the 
employment. Those on temporary one-year contracts will be able to convert their contracts 
to permanent ones and those who have worked for the employer for a decade or completed 
two consecutive fixed-term contracts will be automatically offered open-ended contracts. 
Severance pay is required unless the employee refuses to renew the contract; this payment, 
for lawfully terminated contracts, is as much as 12 times the employer’s monthly salary 
during his/her employment duration or 12 times 300% of the local average monthly salary, 
and is doubled for unlawfully terminated contracts, which makes labor reallocation much 
more costly than before. The employer is required to submit layoff plans to the labor 
administrative department explaining the situation to the labor union or to all employees 
30 days in advance if dismissing more than 20 persons or over 10% of the total workforce. 
This introduces high fixed firing costs as well as social insurance. To realize the second 
primary goal, the LCL stipulates that a contract must specify social insurance 
arrangements.  
The strict employment protection articles in the LCL may incur “adaptive” 
incentives for both employers and employees, resulting in mixed or sometimes intended 
labor market outcomes. On the demand side, Chen and Funke (2009) construct a 
theoretical model for firms’ behavior under the new law and calibrate their intertemporally 
optimal labor demand constrained by fixed and increasing costs of hiring and firing. Their 
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model predicts a larger “inaction” regime in which firms delay new appointments as well 
as layoffs. This yields ambiguous employment outcomes at the firm level as both 
recruitment and redundancy become more difficult. However, over a 10-year period, they 
predict that the aggregated employment in urban China will increase as long as the 
economic growth rate can be maintained or, at the firm level, labor productivity growth 
outpaces wage growth. Cooper et al. (2013) use Annual Surveys of Industrial Production 
(1998-2007) to simulate the consequences of the LCL. They find that increasing firing 
costs make a positive and robust impact on private firms’ employment at the expense of 
low labor re-allocative efficiency. Nevertheless, the field work (including 320 workers in 
Shenzhen in May 2008) conducted by Wang et al. (2009) also reveals firms’ adverse 
responses which circumvent the LCL. 22% of workers reported that their employers 
increased dormitory and canteen prices and fines for insubordination to offset minimum 
wage provision and increased costs of hiring. Some firms forced employees to terminate 
their contracts before the new law came into effect and rehired them thereafter and some 
labor-intensive manufacturers shifted to regions where wages were relatively low.  
On the supply side, the consequences in sequential job search and match are still 
unclear. Job-match efficiency in urban China declined substantially from 1996 to 2008 
(Liu, 2013). Despite varying degrees of enforcement across regions and adoption by 
employers, some empirical studies have revealed a positive relationship between the 
implementation of LCL and signing long and short term contracts. Migrant workers in the 
Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province witnessed 7% increases in the contract rate 
according to Becker and Elfstrom (2010) and 18% according to Li and Freeman (2014) 
(from 43% in 2007 to 61% in 2008). Another survey including 4,758 migrant workers in 
3,120 industrial firms across 40 cities conducted by Zhejiang University points to an 
increase of 8.6% from 2007 to 2008. Signing a contract increased coverage of the five 
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principal types of social insurance and reduced wage arrears (Gao et al., 2012; Li and 
Freeman, 2014). The China Urban Labor Survey (CULS) shows that 22.2% (20.5%) of 
migrant workers obtained employer-provided pensions (health insurance) and this 
proportion increased to 23.8% (21.8%) in 2010 (Gallagher et al., 2013). Based on the 
2008 wave of Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC), Cheng et al. (2015) document 
many benefits along with signing a labor contract, such as higher wages, shorter working 
hours, and improved access to various employee benefits, in particular, three crucial social 
insurance schemes. Nevertheless, segregation in labor markets persists in urban China 
according to their results: more urban than migrant workers benefit from social insurance 
and contracts have greater subjective value to urban employees than to migrants. There is 
no clear correlation between having a contract and participating in social insurance, 
especially for migrants who may have difficulties in paying for pension and health 
insurance (Li, 2008). Compared with provision made in a formal contract, personal 
contributions are large and increasing.3 In hard times, migrants have to rely on their own 
savings or the help of social networks in the city (Giles et al., 2006) and on family support 
(Zhao, 2003) and land in rural hometowns (Wang et al., 2013). Anomalies are intensified 
by inconsistency in enforcement of the LCL. The CULS suggests that a contract does not 
necessarily entitle employees to social insurance (Gallagher et al., 2013). The case studies 
in Chan (2009) also show notable limitation in access to employee benefits in globalized 
or female-employee-intensive industries (Cui et al., 2013).  
                                               
3 In 2008, the employee (employer) had to contribute 8% (20%), 2% (7%) and 1% (2%) of the city-average 
monthly salary to pension, medical insurance and unemployment insurance. The employer was also 
responsible for work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance equivalent to 0.6%-2% (depending on 
industries) and 1% of the city-average monthly salary. The city-average monthly salaries have increased 
quickly, implying increasing financial burden for both employees and employers. This discourages 
employees from buying insurance. The Enterprise Annuity Report published annually by the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security since 2007 shows that the number of enterprises setting up annuities 
increased only by 3.4% in 2008 and 1.2% in 2009.  
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The present study contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, it 
adds to the studies on the ambiguous wellbeing consequences of EPL by identifying 
dynamic causality between employment protection, past unemployment history and post-
unemployment outcomes. Salvatori (2010) and Freeman (2010) provide recent cross-
country examination by using the European Community Household Survey and empirical 
evidence in developing countries, respectively. It would be of considerable interest to see 
new evidence from developing countries undergoing extensive socio-economic 
transformations. Urban China, in a situation of rapid economic growth, quick recovery 
from financial crisis, inconsistency in law-implementation, heterogeneous employer 
responses and segregated domestic labor markets, offers an ideal environment to assess 
the varied impact of EPL on employees’ wellbeing. It is also worth noting time-varying 
employment effects, as pointed out by Chen and Funke’s (2009) theoretical model. There 
have been different outcomes in unemployment duration since the enactment of the law. 
Both employers and employees’ behavior and the macroeconomic environment change 
over time, especially during the economic downturn covered by our sample period.4 The 
role of the LCL in formalizing labor markets has also weakened over time given official 
report.5 Nevertheless, the aforementioned empirical studies have described the situation by 
descriptive statistics or case studies, or estimated (static) average treatment effects 
separately on different labor outcomes. The dynamic and complex role of the LCL 
remains unclear.  
Second, this paper further highlights heterogeneity in dynamic causality among 
various labor market outcomes. It distinguishes between the overall and compositional 
impact of the LCL on labor market transitions and outcomes – the differences (or 
                                               
4 For example, Knight and Li (2006) find a positive association between past unemployment duration and 
post-unemployment wages by using data from 2000. 
5 According to the National Migrant Workers Report published annually by the NBS since 2009, the national 
average contract rate for migrant workers has remained around 42% since the enactment of the LCL (2008-
2013) with diminution of permanent contracts and insurance-coverage. 
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discrimination, if any) between urban local workers and rural-to-urban migrants, and 
between males and females. 
Third, this study makes a methodological advance in accordance with a rich dataset. 
It exploits a panel dataset covering individual urban and migrant workers in 15 cities from 
coastal to western China with individual employment history as long as a decade (2000-
2009) and as many as four job transitions. As suggested in Giles et al. (2012), household 
surveys with individual employment histories can better facilitate the estimation of 
employment effects. We anchor dynamic endogeneity during the individual’s sequential 
job search and match to a non-parametric joint distribution. Based on this, we identify the 
unemployment duration-dependent causal impact of LCL by using a sharp regression 
discontinuity design embedded in joint duration and multi-equation mixed models 
including simultaneously the probability of getting employed (i.e., unemployment hazard) 
and three critical dimensions of post-unemployment job match quality, namely job 
security in terms of employment hazard rates, wage level and the likelihood of coverage 
by employer-provided social insurance schemes.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
dataset and provides exploratory analysis. Section 4 spells out the model. Section 5 
discusses results and finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Construction of dataset 
We use the Longitudinal Survey on Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) in 2008 
and 2009 administered by the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). The dataset consists 
of rural and urban household surveys and the rural-to-urban migrant survey. This paper 
pools the latter two as the full sample. The migrant survey covers 15 cities in 9 provinces, 
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including provincial capital cities, municipalities and other major migrant receiving cities. 
The urban household survey covers 19 cities covering those in the migrant survey and 4 
additional ones.6 Table 1 lists the definition of all variables in our empirical analysis. 
[Table 1] 
We select sample workers by the following 6 steps. First, frictional unemployment is 
excluded to help purge the true impact of the Law on employment transitions. As there is 
no clear time cut-off distinguishing frictional unemployment from other kinds of 
unemployment, we define a cut-off of two weeks (14 days) and drop individuals (less than 
1%) whose unemployment intervals are shorter. Second, we drop those outside working 
age – younger than 16 years old for both males and females or older than 60 for males and 
55 for females. Third, those who are self-employed are also dropped since the new LCL 
focuses on formal labor markets. 7  Fourth, we purge the influence of the dramatic 
institutional changes in urban labor markets moving from a socialist system to a contract-
based one. Specifically, urban residents had been guaranteed jobs in the state or collective-
owned sectors until the mid-1990s, the “iron rice bowl” period. 8  The government 
restructured the state sector from 1994 by privatizing non-profitable or small/medium 
sized SOEs in order to protect large ones, which shattered the “iron rice bowl” and led to 
massive redundancy9 as well as some job creation and high rates of reallocation (Dong 
and Xu, 2009). Thus, we further excluded those who obtained (or lost) jobs before 2000 
and remained employed (or unemployed) thereafter. Fifth, individuals unemployed for 
more than 36 months were excluded. We considered that this population might not 
                                               
6 See http://idsc.iza.org/?page=27&id=58 for detailed information on sampling (accessed 13 January 2016).  
7 Workers may switch between employee jobs and self-employment in the presence of the LCL. We drop 
self-employed individuals given two concerns. For one thing, urban local workers have long made their lives 
on employee jobs rather than self-employment. For another, the LCL mainly “tightens” employers’ costs of 
hiring and “adaptive behavior” in hiring as reviewed in Sections 1-2. The present paper focuses on how 
reemployment and wellbeing of employees have been affected by the LCL, while switch between 
employment and self-employment is beyond our scope.  
8 See Cai et al. (2008) for a comprehensive review of the history of China’s labor markets. 
9 Over the period 1995-2000, urban employment dropped by 28% and 52% in the state and collective sectors, 
respectively. Authors’ calculation based on the China Statistical Yearbook 2001 published by the NBS.  
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endeavor to find jobs, or might have poor work ethics which were part of their unobserved 
heterogeneity, or simply reported they were available for work when they were not. As 
such, transition spells of this population may not just be a result of LCL. Excluding them 
helps mitigate the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement errors. Sixth, 
for the urban dataset, those who remained in 2008 as well as 2009 were selected to track 
longer trajectories of individual transitions in labor markets. After accounting for the 
attrition rate of 5.7%, there were 1,954 urban local workers in each wave (Table 2). For 
the migrant dataset, we pooled two waves to include as many samples as possible given 
the high attrition rate (64%) in 2009 compared with 2008.10 Note that attrition only affects 
whether the individual has transition records beyond 2008 (i.e., the number of workers 
having the maximum number of (i.e., 4) transitions) with little influence on consistency of 
estimates, as we have transformed the dataset into the shape of “individual-employment 
(or unemployment) transition-spell length (number of months)”. The distribution of urban/ 
migrant and male/ female workers was balanced within city (Table 2). More than half the 
selected workers, both urban and migrant, worked in service industries (followed by 
manufacturing) and were manual laborers. 
[Table 2] 
We proceed to derive sample workers’ employment history. For employed 
individuals at the time of interview, there was one question: “When did you start this job?” 
We used it to count the length of employment spell in months and inferred backwardly the 
time of transiting from unemployment into this employment spell. Another question was 
“How long did it take you to find this job?” This gave us the length of the immediately 
past unemployment spell and so helped infer the time of starting that unemployment spell. 
                                               
10 This attrition is likely to be exogenously affected by the financial crisis rather than endogenous selection 
of remaining migrants. Flow population in China has long been migrating to different cities or returning to 
hometowns. The survey team reports particular difficulties during the financial crisis in tracking them. 
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As such, the 2008 wave allows us to track at most 2 recent transitions for those who were 
employed at the time of interview. For unemployed individuals at the time of interview, 
the question “When did you leave your last job?” helped us identify the length of current 
unemployment spell in months and the time of the immediately past transition from 
employment to (current) unemployment. As such, the 2008 wave allows us to track at 
most 1 recent transition for those who were unemployed at the time of interview. By 
analogy, information of at most 2 transitions and the length of employment and 
unemployment can be extracted from the 2009 wave. Note that individuals had different 
starting time for their transition trajectories as the surveys are retrospective, and two 
ending dates.11 Overall, such a data structure allows at most 2 transitions for those in just 
one wave and 4 transitions for those in both waves.12  
 
3.2. Data description 
Figure 1 describes macro economy in finally selected sample cities. They performed 
relatively well – only 5 out of 19 cities (26.3%) were worse off than the national average 
in terms of GDP per capita and there was considerable openness – exports were higher 
than the national average. Overall, the domestic economy appeared to relate positively to 
exports. Local labor market outcomes may be sensitive to the city-level (domestic) 
economic environment and to the fluctuations of the international markets (notably the 
financial crisis hitting China in the second half of 2008), especially for migrants many of 
whom worked in export and manufacturing enterprises (Meng et al., 2010). This justifies 
our control of macroeconomic environment in regressions in Section 4. 
[Figure 1] 
                                               
11 The dates are 15 June 2008 for those only in the 2008 wave and 15 June 2009 for those only in the 2009 
wave or in both waves. 
12 The case of 4 transitions could be such individuals who were found employed in 2008 (for whom the 
previous two transitions can be identified), transited into unemployment sometime between 2008 and 2009 
but were luckily re-employed in the 2009 wave.  
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For individual workers, Table 5 tabulates the number of their observed transitions in 
labor markets. Regardless of gender or of different types of work, the overwhelming 
majority (at least 83.47%) experienced one transition. About 11% of urban samples 
experienced two transitions, which is in sharp contrast to 1.32% for migrants. The group 
experiencing three transitions was not small – 5.94% urban and 4.02% migrant workers. 
[Table 2] 
We proceed to look at four labor market outcomes. Figures 2 and 3 depict separately 
the empirical hazard rates of unemployment and (subsequent) re-employment. The 
downward slopes indicate that the longer the unemployment (re-employment) duration, 
the lower the probability of finding (losing) a job, i.e., negative duration dependence in 
both unemployment and re-employment spells. Figure 2(a) suggests that the LCL makes 
harder for local urban workers to find jobs, but this effect is likely to be short-term and 
fades away after 6 months’ unemployment. By contrast, Figure 2(b) indicates that the 
negative impact of the LCL on migrants’ probabilities of re-employment is trivial for 
those out of work for one month, but the difference in hazard rates of unemployment 
before and after the implementation of the LCL increases after 6 months of unemployment 
duration. Figure 3 shows that neither urban nor migrant groups appeared to be influenced 
substantially by the LCL in their job seeking after longer unemployment.13   
[Figures 2-3] 
As introduced in Section 1, the central goal of the LCL was to formalize the labor 
market. Table 3 summarizes the contract status for sample individuals’ primary jobs. In 
2008, 83% of urban workers signed short-term, long-term or permanent contracts, as 
opposed to about 48% of migrants. More migrants obtained contracts in 2009 but this 
                                               
13  The Log-rank and Wilcox tests of equal survivor functions in Figures 2-3 are rejected at the 1% 
significance level except for migrants’ unemployment-to-employment transition. This indicates statistically 
significant differences in job-finding rates and subsequent job security triggered by the LCL, despite 
possibly small magnitude of its impact. 
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proportion (72.57%) was still lower than their urban counterparts (83.12%). Among those 
with formal contracts, more workers had long-term contracts of over 1 year in both urban 
and migrant groups than those with permanent or short-term contracts for under a year. It 
is worth noting that the proportion of urban workers with permanent contracts decreased 
from 16.34% in 2008 to 15.93% in 2009, while this proportion for migrants in 2009 rose 
2.5 times from 6.59% to 16.88% and there were broadly balanced increases for both male 
and female workers. It signals a generally favorable impact of the LCL on formalization of 
labor markets. Nevertheless, this improvement was uneven between urban and migrant 
workers and across cities. There were more contracted migrants between 2008 and 2009 in 
every city except Wuxi, as opposed to more contracted local urban workers only in Hefei 
and Bengbu (Anhui province) and no improvement at all in coastal (Guangzhou in 
Guangdong province and Hangzhou in Zhejiang province) and western regions (Mianyang 
in Sichuan province). The contract rate among urban workers even dropped in a few cities 
in both coastal and inland regions such as Ningbo (-9%), Luoyang (-16%), and Leshan (-
12.5%).  
[Table 3] 
Uneven improvement between urban and migrant workers is also observed in wages. 
The average monthly wage was 1,997 yuan for urban workers in 2008, 21% higher than 
migrant workers’ (1,655 yuan). The gap was more pronounced in 2009 than in 2008 – 
urban workers (2,306 yuan) earned 34% more than migrant workers did (1,716 yuan). 
Wages increased from 2008 to 2009 for urban workers except only three cities (Leshan 
and Anyang in Sichuan province and Bengbu in Anhui province), but migrant workers in 
6 out of 15 cities (40%) suffered from wage reduction. The average annual growth rate of 
real wage was 15.1% for urban workers, which was in sharp contrast to 6.1% for migrants 
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with huge regional disparity – this positive average growth rate was driven mainly by a 
coastal province, Guangdong, and a central province, Henan.  
At the same time, gender disparity emerged in wages. Figure 4 plots the sample 
women’s median monthly wages against the men’s by city. Women’s wages were lower in 
both urban and migrant groups in every city during the sample period, except female 
migrants in Wuxi in 2009 because of that city’s favorable policies for migrant workers.14 
Female urban workers in central and western areas were most disadvantaged – the median 
wage of those in Leyang in 2008 was only 30% of their male counterparts (Figure 4(a)). 
Coastal areas witnessed the greatest discrepancy for female migrants – the median wage of 
those in Hefei and Ningbo was 40% less than that of their male counterparts (Figure 4(b)). 
The average female (male) urban workers’ median wage level was 9.3% (21.8%) higher 
than their migrant counterparts. Across different industries as in Figure 5, women were 
still worse off in most manufacturing and service industries in which the majority labor 
force participated, while women enjoyed higher wages than men in only a few high-
skilled industries such as finance, education, health, technical services and the public 
sector.  
[Figures 4 and 5] 
Another important aim of the LCL was insurance-coverage in migrant workers’ 
contracts. In fact, there was less improvement in social protection than in formalization. 
Table 4 tabulates four kinds of employer-provided social insurance, namely injury 
insurance, pension, unemployment insurance and housing funds. The coverage rate of a 
complete insurance package increased by only 2.93% for urban workers (from 29.61% to 
32.54%), and decreased by 2.57% for migrants (6.79% to 4.22%). The former 
                                               
14  Such policies are a special regulation requiring employees to set up “wage payment reserves” in 
accounting to guarantee timely wage payment for migrant workers and fewer barriers to converting a rural 
household registration (Hukou) to an urban one. Those who have signed a labor contract and paid social 
insurance for at least two years can obtain a local urban Hukou for him/herself as well as children and 
spouse.  
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improvement was a result of higher coverage rates of all kinds of insurance. Given that the 
coverage rates of migrants’ social insurance were higher in all kinds except housing, we 
suspected that the shrinking coverage of complete social insurance for migrants might be 
due to reduced housing assistance and/or employers’ selection in providing social 
insurance for migrant workers. The gender break-down in Table 4 suggests that the 
improvement in coverage was greater for males than for females. Figure 6 shows that 
coverage of social insurance was unequal across cities, even within the same province. 
The coverage rates for urban workers in Guangdong province (Guangzhou and Dongguan) 
were high and increased but were low and decreased in the adjacent city, Shenzhen. In 
Sichuan province, a further 19.6 and 4.1% of urban workers in Leshan and Chengdu, 
received employer-provided social insurance in 2009 compared with 2008, while the 
coverage in Mianyang backslid by 0.6% (from 20.6% to 20%). The inequality in complete 
social insurance for migrants was more pronounced than among urban workers. As shown 
in Figure 6(b), Wuxi again suggests a “pro-migrant” environment: despite a 6% drop 
between 2008 and 2009, the coverage rate was extraordinarily high and even higher than 
the great majority of cities in Figure 6(a). In Guangdong province, Dongguan and 
Shenzhen experienced tiny increases in recipients of social insurance of 0.9% and 2.8%. 
In contrast, the coverage almost tripled in Chongqing and Chengdu in the western region.  
[Table 4] 
[Figure 6] 
To sum up, our data suggest that the LCL may well affect not only the job-finding 
rates, depending on job seekers’ past experiences in unemployment, but also subsequent 
welfare outcomes such as the hazard of losing the job, wages and probabilities of 
receiving social insurance. Further, there exists substantial heterogeneity in 
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implementation of the LCL and thus, different labor market outcomes between 
demographic groups as well as across cities.  
 
4. Model 
Motivated by the theories, the empirical model of this paper considers in a reduced-form 
specification the transition from unemployment to employment, jointly with three 
subsequent post-matching outcomes which are made dependent on not only the 
implementation of LCL but also individuals’ past unemployment duration, namely 
employment hazard (job security), wages and provision of social insurance. Suppose the 
individual i  has been unemployed until ut  and the transition takes place at the end of the 
time interval 1( , ]u ut t , labelled as uj , the probability of i  exiting unemployment at 
duration ud  at time ut , given that (s)he has stayed in unemployment spells up to ut  can be 
expressed as a standard discrete-time hazard: 
    Pr |u u ui u ui uh t T t T t    (1) 
As Caliendo et al. (2013), we adopt empirically a log-logistic specification to represent the 
exit rate from unemployment to employment,  u t , in period t : 
       11 expui uit y t

    (2) 
where  
 
     
    
1 2
1 1
3 0 4 0 5            1
k k
ui u ud uid u ud uid u i u it
d d
u i i u i i u ct ui
y t f d f d D X
D Time Time D Time Time X
   
   
 
   
      
   (3) 
In Eq. (3), u  denotes a constant in this unemployment equation.  uid uf d  represents the 
base line hazard which is a function of duration ( ud ) that i  has sunk into unemployment 
spells. In order to better accommodate non-linear duration dependence, the empirical 
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analysis applies non-parametric specification to  uid uf d , i.e., a set of dummies reflecting 
an interval at which i  is at risk of shifting out of unemployment spells. 1ˆud  with 
 1, ,ud k   captures true duration dependence of unemployment. itX  includes 
household-specific characteristics (e.g., age, gender, educational attainment, health status, 
dependency ratio, occupation and in which industry i  was working. ctX  includes city-
level covariates, including (time-variant) natural logarithmic GDP per capita and export 
per capita compatible with constructed individuals’ transitions.15 Inspired by calibrations 
of Chen and Funke’s (2009) theoretical model, Chinese firms’ hiring decision varies 
according to output market conditions over time. Inclusion of these micro and macro 
variables helps purges this demand-side effect and the influences of individuals’ 
macroeconomic dynamics (particularly during the financial crisis, 2008-2009). ui  denotes 
the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity driving i ’s transition out of unemployment 
spells. iD  is the treatment indicator, taking the value of 1 if the unemployment took place 
after the implementation of the LCL and zero otherwise. In other words, the assignment of 
treatment and control groups depends on time: i  belongs to the treatment (control) group 
if i ’s transition out of his/her current situation took place after (prior to) January 1st, 2008. 
The forcing variable should be strictly exogenous for valid identification of treatment 
effects. Figure 7 depicts the distribution of transition time from unemployment to 
employment for urban and migrant workers, respectively. No significant discontinuity is 
evident around the cut-off, which is the date the LCL was put in effect. More specifically, 
the McCrary’s (2008) density test cannot firmly reject the null hypothesis of equal density 
distribution of transition time before and after January 1st, 2008 – the logarithm 
                                               
15 That is, we compile city-level variables into individual-month-transition/performance dataset constructed 
in Section 3 according to the time (month and year). 
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differences in height of the density estimates are 0.183 with the standard error being 0.092 
for urban workers and 0.097 with the standard error being 0.149 for migrants.   
[Figure 7] 
This conforms to a sharp regression discontinuity, in the language of Caliendo et al. 
(2013), with the date of implementation of the LCL (and thus, the length of time between 
it and the labor transition) being the satisfactory forcing variable. The estimate of the 
interaction between the receipt of treatment and the baseline hazard, uˆd , captures the 
causal impact of the LCL on unemployment hazard conditional on individuals’ past 
unemployment duration. In order to improve identification, we also directly controlled for 
the forcing variable to accommodate any correlation between the transition rate and the 
time (in months) from the transition out of the current spell to the enforcement of the law 
(i.e., 0iTime Time  and    01 i iD Time Time  in Eq. 3). Therefore, 3ˆ u  and 4ˆ u  help 
purge the causal impact of the LCL ( uˆd ) of unconditional time trends which may be 
driven by other unobserved factors affecting the whole labor markets. 4ˆ u  also picks up 
influences of individuals’ expectations of the enforcement of the LCL on their labor 
market behavior for those transiting out of unemployment before the LCL. Unlike uˆd , 
3
ˆ
u  and 4ˆ u  can be understood as the impact of the LCL on the probability of exit from 
unemployment unconditional to i’s previous unemployment duration. 
The worker i will not stop after exiting unemployment spells, but rather continue 
his/her “journey” in labor markets and bear the outcomes. As reviewed in Section 2, 
employers’ as well as employees’ own adaptive responses to the LCL may yield 
ambiguous effects for employees’ wellbeing in this sequential job match process. The 
present section proceeds to modelling the aforementioned three outcomes following 
successful job matching.    
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First, by analogy to Eq. (3), i’s job stability in terms of transition from employment 
to unemployment can be written as:  
       11 expei eit y t

    (4) 
where 
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As in Eq. (3),  uid uf d  and the associated estimator 1ˆed  measure true unemployment 
duration dependence. eˆd  reflects the unemployment-duration-dependent causal impact of 
the LCL on subsequent job stability for those who left unemployment in the interval ud .
16 
Additionally, we control explicitly for employment duration (  eid ef d ) to improve 
identification and pick up true employment duration dependence.  
Second, the wage equation is expressed as follows: 
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 (6) 
where ˆwd  measures the causal impact of the LCL on post-unemployment wages 
depending on the length of previous unemployment duration. The previous unemployment 
duration is explicitly controlled for by  uid uf d  with the estimator 1ˆwd . To improve 
identification of Eq. (6) compared to previous transmissions (Eqs. 1-5), we further 
controlled for the employment length (logarithmic months) of the individual’s current job 
                                               
16 One may be concerned with heteroskedasticity in errors as some households with multiple transitions 
between employment and unemployment were used more than once in the duration equations (Eqs. 2-5). 
Adopting Solon et al.’s (2015) suggestion, we detected this problem by the following two steps. First, we 
obtained the standard errors by estimation the models in Section 4. Second, the estimated standard error for 
each subject i in the models was regressed on 1/Ji where Ji denotes the within-group population, in other 
words, how many times i has been used in the unemployment duration model (Eqs. 2-3) and/or the 
employment duration model (Eqs. 4-5). The OLS estimation yields statistically insignificant estimator for 
1/Ji, which implies broadly homoscedastic standard errors. This is not surprising in our dataset as only 7% of 
the full sample was used more than once.  
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and the natural logarithmic monthly subsidies of accommodation and food provided by the 
employer in itX . 
Third, the individuals who successfully find a job are also likely to be covered by 
social insurance as emphasized by the LCL for the protection of employees. Let 1is   
denote having a complete social insurance package (including injury insurance, 
unemployment insurance, pension, and housing funds) and zero otherwise. The probability 
of obtaining social insurance is expressed by: 
  
   
    
1 2
1 1
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1 0
k k
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1 (7) 
where ˆsd  captures the causal impact of the LCL on new job quality in terms of employer-
provided social insurance, which presumably hinges on the length of i’s previous 
unemployment duration at ud . The previous unemployment duration  uid uf d  is included 
explicitly to help disentangle the above unemployment duration-dependent causal impact. 
To enhance identification of Eq. (7) compared to previous equations (Eqs. 1-6), we further 
controlled for whether the individual has local urban household registration (Hukou) 
which is  attached to various local social protection packages in itX  and the city-level 
coverage rate of employer-provided social insurance in ctX .
17  
We assume that each unobserved heterogeneity – ui , ei , wi  and si  – follows a 
normal distribution in their own equations. The likelihood for each observation in the 
system is the product of the likelihood for four labor outcomes: 
                                               
17  Presumably these instruments in wage and insurance regressions correlate with their own outcome 
variables but are irrelevant to the other outcomes. Note that they are not necessarily strictly exogenous 
instrumental variables for each outcome equation as other unobservables underlying each outcome variable 
are also made correlated and jointly distributed. Here weak instruments are sufficient to help improve 
substantially the identification of the whole system (Roodman, 2011). 
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where the indicator u  ( e ) takes the value of one if i transits from unemployment 
(employment) to employment (unemployment) and zero otherwise;    denotes the 
cumulative normal distribution function derived from Eq. (7).  
We further address dynamic endogeneity by assuming that above four kinds of 
unobservables embedded in the same worker i follow an unspecified joint and discrete 
distribution supported by mass points rather than an independent normal distribution for 
each unobservable. As such, individual’s transition to employment status and the 
following wellbeing outcomes in labor markets may be driven jointly by his/her 
unobserved ability and/or intrinsic characteristics across the above four sequential labor 
market outcomes (i.e., individual’s coherent traits underlying his/her sequentially 
coordinated decisions and performance in labor markets). 
In line with Heckman and Singer (1984), we estimate Eqs. (2)-(7) jointly and non-
parametrically. Let individuals be separated into  1, ,m M   groups based on 
unobserved traits that underlie their different hazards of transition between employment 
and unemployment, and the associated subsequent wage levels and probabilities of 
participating in social insurance schemes. For each type of traits m , the individual i falling 
into this type is endowed with the unobservables,  , , ,um em wm sm    , leading to his/her 
observed four labor outcomes. Each unobserved factor is time-invariant and individual-
specific for each outcome. For the same person i, the four unobservables in four outcomes 
are correlated and jointly distributed, but do not necessarily have the same magnitude. 
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More importantly, the unobservables do not correlate with observed characteristics or 
treatment under the RDD set-up. The probability of having a particular combination of 
four unobserved traits underlying his/her four labor states is defined by
 Pr , , ,ui um ei em wi wm si sm m             . Therefore, the individual i’s likelihood 
function becomes iml  if i is endowed with  , , ,um em wm sm     at the probability of m . The 
sample likelihood function is written as: 
 
11
N M
m im
mi
L l

   (9) 
Empirically, we begin by estimating Eqs. (2)-(7) under the joint normal distribution 
of four kinds of unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., the benchmark regression.18 Then, we use 
the estimation results of the benchmark regression as initial values and evaluate the 
likelihood function Eq. (9) with two mass points determined by the Newton-Raphson 
method. One more mass point (k) is added if the value of Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) decreases. The search procedure for mass points stops when the AIC ceases to 
decline.  
We estimate separately the above model for (1) urban and migrant workers, and (2) 
male and female workers.19 In other words, the identification (Eqs. 3 and 5) relies on 
temporal variation before and after the implementation of the LCL within each type of 
workers, rather than the (second) differences in labor market (sequential) outcomes 
between urban and migrant workers or between male or female workers. The inter-group 
differences will be discussed by comparing the group-specific estimation results. The 
                                               
18 The initial values of parameters used to evaluate the likelihood function Eq. (8) are selected randomly 
within [-100, 100]. For each initial value, we iterate 100 times to make sure of convergence and obtain the 
ML estimators. To minimize the local maximum problem, we also set randomly 1,000 initial values for each 
of the four equations representing four labor market outcomes separately and obtain the estimators after 
comparing ln   across them. Then, we re-set initial values around those estimators and obtain the final 
results of the benchmark regression. That those results are similar to those obtained before indicates that the 
ML estimators are valid and can be used with confidence.   
19 An ideal divide would be looking at different genders within urban and migrant workers, i.e., 4 subgroups. 
However, estimates become significantly inefficient given limited sample sizes in this divide.  
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considerations driving this strategy are that (i) workers in different subgroups search in the 
same labor market, (ii) firms may not be able to direct completely their search toward a 
particular group of workers, (iii) other observed factors in the model might affect different 
subgroups in different ways and adequately capture macroeconomic changes between 
2008 and 2009.20 
 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Duration-dependent impact on unemployment 
We first detect the overall duration dependence by estimating Eqs. 3 and 5 with a fully 
parametric specification (   lnuid u uf d d  and   lneid e ef d d ) and the treatment indicator  
iD without other covariates. As shown in the upper panel of Table 6, negative 
unemployment duration appears, consistent with our data structure in Figure 2. The law 
itself also affects labor markets: it delays reemployment for urban and male workers and 
threaten the security of the new jobs for all subgroups.  
[Table 6] 
We then implement the search procedure and non-parametric specification in 
Section 4 and identify 5 mass points. The fully non-parametric specification of 
unemployment duration yields negative duration dependence in the first month of 
unemployment for all four groups: the estimated coefficients of one-month unemployment 
( 1ˆud  in Eq. 3) are -6.556, -23.558, -6.223 and -6.193 for urban workers, migrants, males 
and females at 5% significance levels.21 They can be translated into average marginal 
effects of one-month unemployment on reemployment probabilities by the following 
equation:  
                                               
20 For instance, migrant workers suffered from the 2008-09 recession more than urban workers did. 
21 Full estimation results of unemployment duration dummies are available from the authors upon request.  
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That is, -20, -36.4, -40.6 and -36.1 percentage points for four subgroups separately. There 
is substantial individual heterogeneity: the strongest negative unemployment dependence 
(-99.2%) appeared among migrant workers.  
This echoes the negative unemployment duration dependence in Figure 2 as well as 
the shape of duration dependence – the first (quickly) downward-sloping and then flat 
unemployment hazard rates at longer unemployment duration. Further, short-term 
negative duration dependence has driven the overall negative estimators of unemployment 
duration in the upper panel of Table 6. This also means that the fully parametric 
approximation of past unemployment duration exaggerates negative unemployment 
duration dependence in the long-term by over-simplifying the situation and this justifies 
our flexible and non-parametric model specifications.  
Different from Table 6, the LCL exhibits compositional effects across subgroups as 
well as different past unemployment spells. Tables 7-8 report the duration-dependent 
impact of the LCL on unemployment transitions, i.e., uˆd , eˆd , ˆwd  and ˆsd  in Eqs. (3), 
(5), (6) and (7) separately. We first look at unemployment-duration-dependent job-finding 
probabilities in the presence of LCL ( uˆd ). As aforementioned, the degrees of one-month 
unemployment duration dependence ( 1ˆud ) were much stronger for migrants (-23.558) 
than for urban workers (-6.556). The LCL further lowered migrants’ job-finding rates after 
a month’s unemployment more than it did for their urban counterparts as indicated by the 
negative uˆd  (i.e., -7.583 in Column 5 as opposed to -3.286 in Column 1 of Table 7). Such 
downward shift of short-term negative unemployment duration is stronger for males 
compared to females (-10.096 in Column 1 as opposed to -4.925 in Column 5 of Table 8). 
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Again, we can translate conditional impact of the LCL on job-finding probabilities at the 
end of the first month’s unemployment into average marginal effects by: 
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The LCL on average strengthens the negative unemployment state dependence by 4, 32, 
31 and 4.8 percentage points for urban locals, migrants, males and females separately in 
their first month’s unemployment. The largest reduction of 41.2 percentage points in job-
finding probabilities was again observed among migrants and a quarter of migrants 
suffered from at least a 20-percentage-point decrease under the LCL.  
The negative impact of the LCL on reemployment dissipates quickly after one 
month of unemployment in all subgroups. Neither estimating the model without 
macroeconomic controls (GDP and exports) nor controlling the city-level unemployment 
rate as an additional regressor changes the above results, excluding the suspicion that the 
bargaining power induced by the pool size of the unemployed influences job-finding rates. 
[Tables 7 and 8] 
Overall, the LCL strengthens negative unemployment duration without 
contaminating significantly job seekers’ searching intensity. The downward-shifting effect 
of the LCL on “true” negative unemployment-state dependence is likely to be realized by 
strengthening firms’ sorting towards certain (high-skill or low-cost) types of workers – 
urban locals and females – under stricter EPL, rather than skill depreciation given the 
short-lived true negative duration dependence and the treatment effect (significant within 
one month of unemployment).22 We will discuss further the reasons driving the urban-
                                               
22 It seems counterintuitive that females are preferred to males in the context of developing economies. In 
effect, there is no significant difference between their education – average 9.9 years for sample males and 
9.77 years for sample females. The results here are better understood with the estimates in Column 7 of 
Table 8. Given similar educational levels, we suspected that the unemployed females might be preferred 
because they were less likely to bargain for higher re-employment wages than males under the LCL. 
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migrant and gender differences in job-match probabilities with post-match quality in 
Section 5.2.  
 
5.2. Post-unemployment outcomes in labor markets 
We first look at job security. Employment per se shows negative state duration 
dependence (i.e., negative 2ˆ ed  in Eq. 5) in the first 2 months of employment for local 
urban workers and females and 5 months for migrants which is driven by males.23 In other 
words, the longer the individual stays in the current job, the less likely he/she will leave. 
Past unemployment spells threatens job security (i.e., negative 1ˆed  in Eq. 5) only for 
urban locals. Conditional on the worker’s past unemployment spells, the LCL helps stable 
employment for all subgroups within their first two months’ unemployment (i.e., negative 
eˆd  in Eq. 5 indicated by the first two estimates in Columns 2 and 6 of Tables 7 and 8). 
The magnitude of eˆd  is larger if the worker was re-employed in the first month of 
unemployment than that if the transition to employment took place after two months’ 
unemployment, but eˆd  becomes insignificant if the worker’s unemployment spell lasted 
over two months. This implies that the LCL protects job security for “high type” workers 
signaled by their short unemployment spell length in the past.  
Second, conditional on workers’ past unemployment duration, the wage effects of 
LCL ( ˆwd  in Eq. 6) differ across subgroups. It is positive (negative) for urban (migrant) 
workers within two months’ unemployment (Column 3 (7) of Table 7), meaning that the 
LCL increases urban locals’ reemployment wages but decreases migrants’. It is also worth 
                                               
23 Full estimation results of employment duration dummies are available from the authors upon request. The 
positive employment duration dependence is consistent with the overall downward slope in Figure 3. Fully 
parametric specification in the lower panel of Table 6, however, misleads the conclusion as it is dominated 
by positive state dependence at the longer duration – positive employment duration dependence only 
emerges from the 8th and 10th months of employment for urban and migrant workers, respectively. 
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noting both positive ˆwd  and eˆd  (i.e., 4.443 and 2.606 in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7) 
after 5 months’ unemployment for urban locals indicate that urban job seekers would even 
trade off job security for higher wages.  
These urban-migrant differences are likely to be driven by their differentiated 
incentives: urban local workers consider high income and professional development as top 
priorities when choosing a job (Nielson and Smyth, 2008), while migrants are not only 
motivated by money-making aspirations, but also non-economic incentives such as 
helping (extended) family members, better educational opportunities for children (Song et 
al., 2009) and personal development in terms of pursuit of modernity, city life, 
cosmopolitanism and new knowledge especially among female migrants (Chiang et al., 
2013). Thus, migrants may not deem reemployment wages as their top priority but rather a 
secure urban life: as shown by positive estimates in Column 8 of Table 7, the LCL 
increases migrants’ likelihood of receiving insurances from employers (which were 
previously exclusive for urban locals) even at longer unemployment duration. Moreover, 
the wage-reducing effect of LCL could be predicted as the law binds most on migrants and 
mandated benefits have become enforced.24  
Columns 3 and 7 of Table 8 further unveil wide gender disparity in post-
unemployment wages. Male workers tend to maintain their reemployment wages in the 
presence of LCL if they found jobs within the first two months of unemployment and even 
for jobs found around the 21st interval (about the 36th month) of unemployment, while 
females’ wages did not respond to the LCL. One reason may be gender-differentiated 
motivations in labor markets as aforementioned in Chiang et al. (2013): male workers are 
more likely to have economic motivations, while female workers suggest altruistic 
motivations for family members and children. Our finding also implies that male privilege 
                                               
24 A firm’s costs of hiring a migrant worker under the LCL would rise by 20% even if it pays minimum 
social insurance fees, leading to 4.6% of increases in labor costs for an average firm (Li and Freeman, 2014).  
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in wages illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 in Section 3.2 persists or even becomes wider under 
the LCL.25 Overall, the LCL is likely to widen re-employment wage inequality between 
urban and migrant, and between male and female workers.  
Third, recipient of social insurances under LCL differs mainly between urban and 
migrant workers rather than gender, lending support to our previous discussion on 
differentiated wage effects. Migrants are more likely to receive a complete package 
including four kinds of employer-provided social insurance within the first half year of 
unemployment under the LCL (Column 8 of Table 7). By contrast, the coverage of social 
insurance for urban workers with LCL reacted sluggishly to the LCL, and even decreased 
for those finding new jobs at the 10th and 13th month of unemployment (Column 4 of 
Table 7). As aforementioned, this may be driven by different motivations between 
migrants and urban locals. The former think high of non-economic motivations in labor 
markets: they feel that social protection was worth a longer job seeking process and can 
trade off wages (as indicated by negative estimates in Column 7 of Table 7). Urban 
workers may alternatively trade off employer-provided social insurance (some of which 
they may have obtained because of their urban household registration) for higher pay (as 
indicated by positive estimates in Column 3 of Table 7) if they have been through the 
trauma of losing jobs. Another implication could be drawn from the labor demand side: 
                                               
25 The negative impact of wage for migrants seems to temper the positive result in Cheng et al. (2015) based 
on the RUMiC. Our findings would be better understood with the following differences in mind. First, the 
above studies examined the impact of having a formal labor contract because of implementation of the LCL 
on labor market outcomes, while we identify the impact of the LCL per se rather than its “second order” 
impact brought by obtaining labor contracts. In the presence of varied enforcement of the LCL across 
provinces and employees, a substantial number of migrants – albeit to a less extent – did not sign contracts 
even when the LCL came in force (as reviewed in Section 2 and shown in Table 3). Our result is predictable 
if the non-contracted workers’ wages are supressed under the LCL. Second, the previous studies assessed an 
average treatment effect of the LCL, while our model picks up heterogeneity by making this treatment effect 
dependent on the worker’s past unemployment history. 
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such long unemployment duration may signal workers’ low capabilities and thus, 
employers may be reluctant to provide complete social insurance packages.26  
 
5.3. Other covariates 
Tables 9 and 10 report other control variables and the interaction between some of them 
and the treatment indicator, in order to test by which channels the LCL affects labor 
markets for whom.  
[Tables 9 and 10] 
The estimates of age, education and their interactions with the treatment in Tables 9 
and 10 indicate that employers tended to hire elderly urban or male workers and the low-
educated urban and migrant workers regardless of their gender because they accept lower 
reemployment wages and less likely to leave jobs under the LCL, especially for migrants.  
Sorting of workers is also conditional on occupation and industry. Reemployment 
wages only increase for urban and male workers holding management positions in 
manufacturing sectors. Migrants’ better social insurance coverage is only realized among 
professionals (Column 7 of Table 9). Despite of lowered employment hazard for migrants 
under the LCL as previously discussed in Table 7, they suffer from more volatile 
reemployment with lower pay if working in manufacturing and services sectors (Columns 
5-6 of Table 9), especially males (Column 2 of Table 10). 
It seems counterintuitive that better macroeconomic environment such as high GDP 
and export of the city tends to impair job security for migrants and males under the 
enforcement of LCL, as indicated by their positive interactions with the treatment 
(Column 5 of Table 9 and Column 2 of Table 10). It is worth noting that during economic 
prosperities, recruitment may become relatively easy and redundancy may not seem costly 
                                               
26 Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish between the two due to limited employers’ information in the 
dataset. 
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as that in economic downturns to firms. Thus, as adaptive behavior to strict employment 
protection legislation, employers adopt stringent tenure selection for a large number of 
“low-type” workers such as migrants rather than urban locals. As such, the LCL would 
hamper migrants’ employment stability in the long-term.  
Last, we examine the unconditional impact of the LCL and possible behavioral 
adaptation to the passage of the law before January 1st, 2008 (i.e., the estimates of 
0iTime Time  and    01 i iD Time Time  ). The longer the time elapsed from the passage 
of the LCL, the higher the urban workers’ employment hazard. Together with the 
statistically significant estimates of the time prior to the passage of the LCL on 
employment hazard, wages and insurance coverage, these findings cast doubt on the 
unconditional long-term protective function of the LCL.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a model system embedding a sharp RDD in individuals’ transitions in 
labor markets and post-unemployment job match qualities. This allows us to address 
dynamic endogeneity underlying individuals’ sequential choices and the associated 
welfare outcomes of job matching. Therefore, we can identify the dynamic causal impacts 
of the LCL depending on individuals’ past unemployment histories and, at the same time, 
their subsequent job security and other aspects of wellbeing.  
The LCL tends to intensify the distortion of hiring. Conditional on workers’ past 
unemployment spell, the LCL even shifts downwardly the negative unemployment state 
dependence in the first month of unemployment though long-term employment remains 
unaffected. This negative effect varies with gender and types of workers – it took migrants 
and male workers longer to find new jobs than urban locals and females because the 
former two groups are more inclined to bargain for high wages, while the latter two care 
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more non-economic motivations. Consequently, in the post-unemployment outcomes, job 
security is better for migrants and females (at the expense of lower reemployment wages 
and better social insurance coverage) than for urban workers or males. As such, the LCL is 
likely to exacerbate wage inequality between migrant and urban workers and between 
genders.  
Substantial heterogeneity also exists across occupations and industries. Migrants, 
who worked most in more open sectors such as manufacturing and services industries, 
suffer from more volatile jobs. During economic prosperities, the LCL makes the new jobs 
insecure for migrant and male workers by incurring adaptively employers’ strict tenure 
selection.  
Overall, the LCL seems to have realized its goals in protecting employees by 
enhancing job security, increasing wages and improving coverage of employer-provided 
social insurance in at least the short-term without “locking in” current employment or 
incurring long-term structural unemployment. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all 
these benefits are distributed very unevenly between urban and migrant workers and 
between males and females because of both employees’ motivations and employers’ 
adaptive sorting under the law.  
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Figure 1 Economic condition in sample cities in 2008 
 
Note: The size of the bubble represents the city population. The coastal, central and 
western regions are marked by blue, green and red.  
 
Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier estimates of unemployment hazard rates 
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(b) Migrant 
 
 
Figure 3 Kaplan-Meier estimates of employment hazard rates 
(a) Urban 
 
(b) Migrant 
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Figure 4 Gender differences in wages, by city 
(a) Urban 
 
(b) Migrant 
 
Note: All wages are in 2009 prices. The coastal, central and western regions are marked 
by blue, green and red colors. 
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Figure 5 Gender differences in wages, by industry 
(a) Urban 
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(b) Migrant 
 
Note: All wages are in 2009 prices. 
 
Figure 6 Coverage of complete social insurance in total employment 
(a) Urban 
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(b) Migrant 
 
 
Figure 7 Distribution of transition time from unemployment to employment 
(a) Urban 
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(b) Migrant 
 
Note: The circle represents the average of transition time measured as months to/after 
January 2008 in each bin. The optimal bin size and bandwidth are selected by McCrary’s 
(2008) procedure. The solid line is the smoothed bin midpoints by local linear smoothing 
regressions, the dash lines below and above which frame the 10% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1 Definition and descriptive statisticsa  
Variable Definition 
Urban Migrant 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Treatment      
Treatment Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has unemployment-to-employment 
transition after January 1st, 2008.b 
0.353 0.478 0.244 0.430 
Wage      
Ln(wage) Logarithmic monthly wage (yuan in 2009 prices). 5.425 3.348 4.806 3.477 
Social insurance      
Social insurance Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker obtained a full package of employee 
benefits including 4 social insurances (unemployment, pension, injury and housing); 0 
otherwise. 
0.359 0.480 0.186 0.390 
Demographics      
Gender Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is male and 0 for females.  0.479 0.500 0.559 0.497 
Age The worker’s age measured in years.  36.890 10.999 30.114 9.110 
Edu. The worker’s education level in years.  10.890 1.714 8.979 2.410 
Dependency ratio The number of children (under 18 years old) raised by the worker.  0.412 0.426 0.439 0.433 
Occupation      
Professional Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is a professional; 0 otherwise. 0.169 0.360 0.006 0.063 
Management Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is a manager; 0 otherwise. 0.035 0.178 0.038 0.105 
Manual Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is a manual labor, including clerks, 
service staff in various industries, agricultural workers, and manufacturing and 
transporting related staff; 0 otherwise.  
0.548 0.500 0.553 0.500 
Industry      
Construction Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is in construction firms; 0 otherwise.   0.027 0.165 0.045 0.215 
Manufacturing Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is in manufacturing firms, including 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and production and supply of electricity, gas and 
water; 0 otherwise.  
0.134 0.341 0.163 0.376 
Services Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is in the services industry, including 
transport, storage, post, information transmission, wholesales and retails, hotel and 
catering, finance and banking, insurance, security services, real estate, law, other 
business services, scientific research, agencies, tourism, education, health, journalism 
and publication, entertainment, services to households; 0 otherwise.  
0.507 0.499 0.459 0.500 
Government Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is in the government or other (semi-
)public sectors, including social security and social welfare, public management and 
social organizations, international organizations, and management of water conservancy, 
environment and public facilities; 0 otherwise.  
0.062 0.242 0.002 0.049 
City-level economic conditionsc 
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Ln(city GDP per capita) Logarithmic city-level GDP per capita (yuan in 2009 prices).  10.623 0.632 10.623 0.632 
Ln(city export per capita) Logarithmic city-level export (yuan in 2009 prices). 9.805 1.787 9.805 1.787 
Direct time control      
Time before Jan. 2008 The number of months between the time of unemployment-to-employment transition 
and January 2008 for the transition taking place before the implementation of the LCL.  
52.229 54.616 35.445 30.496 
Time after Jan. 2008 The number of months between the time of unemployment-to-employment transition 
and January 2008 for the transition taking place after the implementation of the LCL. 
8.231 4.757 11.307 6.453 
Additional instruments      
Employment length  The number of months in continuous employment. 52.704 30.998 39.904 28.650 
Ln(monthly subsidies) Logarithmic monthly subsidies provided by the employer (yuan in 2009 prices). 1.254 2.231 1.848 2.686 
Health Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker was sick or injured in the last 3 
months; 0 otherwise.  
0.112 0.315 0.099 0.298 
Local urban Hukou Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has a local urban Hukou and 0 
otherwise.  
0.972 0.164 0.035 0.184 
City-level insurance 
coverage for the study 
populationd 
The city average proportion of workers obtaining a full package of employee benefits 
including 4 social insurances (unemployment, pension, injury and housing). 
0.359 0.015 0.186 0.103 
Note: a. All statistics are the averages of two waves.  
b. It includes those ending with unemployment in the 2009 wave as we have right-censored data in duration models. Excluding those right-censored 
data, the mean is 0.155 for urban workers and 0.229 for migrants.  
c. City-level data are compiled from China City Statistical Yearbooks published annually by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
d. The mean is the same as that of “social insurance” as it is the average of the latter at the city-level and then across all sample cities. The standard 
deviations are different between two variables though.  
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Table 2 Geographic and gender distribution 
 
Note: “ - “ means no data.  
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Table 3 Distribution of contract status of the primary job 
Category 
2008 2009 
Urban (%) Migrant (%) Male (%) Female (%) Urban (%) Migrant (%) Male (%) Female (%) 
Contract         
Permanent 234 (16.34) 102 (6.59) 184 (11.10) 141 (10.44) 235 (15.93) 80 (16.88) 170 (16.25) 145 (16.06) 
Long term (≥ 1 year) 790 (55.17) 499 (32.40) 717 (43.24) 576 (42.64) 904 (61.29) 211 (44.51) 607 (58.03) 508 (56.26) 
Short term (<1 year) 165 (11.52) 138 (8.94) 144 (8.69) 157 (11.62) 87 (5.90) 53 (11.18) 71 (6.79) 69 (7.64) 
Sub-total 1,189 (83.03) 756 (47.93) 1,045 (63.03) 874 (64.69) 1,226 (83.12) 344 (72.57) 848 (81.07) 722 (79.96) 
Non-contract         
Temporary 129 (9.01) 274 (17.63) 202 (12.18) 211 (15.62) 138 (9.36) 107 (22.57) 124 (11.85) 121 (13.40) 
Othersa 114 (7.96) 543 (34.44) 411 (24.79) 266 (19.69) 111 (7.53) 23 (4.85) 74 (7.07) 60 (6.64) 
Sub-total 243 (16.97) 821 (52.07) 613 (36.97) 477 (35.31) 249 (16.88) 130 (27.43) 198 (18.93) 181 (20.04) 
Total employed 1,432 (100) 1,577 (100) 1,658 (100) 1,351 (100) 1,475 (100) 474 (100) 1,046 (100) 903 (100) 
Note: a. The “Others” category includes non-wage workers, part-time jobs, other kinds of jobs, and missing values in contract status for local 
urban workers. It includes family business helper without pay, part-time jobs, probationary period, and missing values in contract status for 
migrant workers.    
 
Table 4 Coverage of employer-provided social insurance 
Insurance 
2008 2009 
Urban (%) Migrant (%) Male (%) Female (%) Urban (%) Migrant (%) Male (%) Female (%) 
Unemployment 
778  
(54.33) 
208  
(13.19) 
512 
(30.88) 
474  
(35.09) 
877  
(59.46) 
73  
(15.40) 
512 
(48.95) 
438  
(48.50) 
Pension 
989  
(69.06) 
285  
(18.07) 
668 
(40.29) 
606  
(44.86) 
1,037 
(70.31) 
104  
(21.94) 
609 
(58.22) 
532  
(58.91) 
Injury 
704  
(49.16) 
278  
(17.63) 
538 
(32.45) 
444  
(32.86) 
789  
(53.49) 
97  
(20.46) 
501 
(47.90) 
385  
(42.64) 
House 
572  
(39.94) 
133  
(8.43) 
372 
(22.44) 
333  
(24.65) 
634  
(42.98) 
36  
(7.59) 
370 
(35.37) 
300  
(33.22) 
All 
424  
(29.61) 
107  
(6.79) 
282 
(17.01) 
249  
(18.43) 
480  
(32.54) 
20  
(4.22) 
279 
(26.67) 
221  
(24.47) 
Total 
employment 
1,432  
(100) 
1,577  
(100) 
1,658 
(100) 
1,351  
(100) 
1,475  
(100) 
474  
(100) 
1,046 
(100) 
903  
(100) 
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Table 5 Distribution of transitions in the labor market 
No. of transitions Transition Urban (%) Migrant (%) Male (%) Female (%) 
1 Employed->unemployed 367 (18.78) 123 (5.43) 166 (7.57) 323 (16.07) 
1 Unemployed->employed 1,264 (64.69) 2,021 (89.23) 1,803 (82.26) 1,473 (73.28) 
 of which “always employed”a  130 (6.65) 9 (0.40) 0 (0.00) 130 (6.47) 
Subtotal  1,631 (83.47) 2,144 (94.66) 1,969 (89.83) 1,796 (89.35) 
2 Employed->unemployed->employed 182 (9.31) 6 (0.26) 89 (4.06) 99 (4.93) 
2 Unemployed->employed->unemployed 25 (1.28) 24 (1.06) 24 (1.09) 24 (1.19) 
Subtotal  207 (10.59) 30 (1.32)  113 (5.15) 123 (16.57) 
3 Unemployed->employed->unemployed 
->employedb 
116 (5.94) 91 (4.02) 110 (5.02) 91 (4.53) 
Subtotal  116 (5.94) 91 (4.02) 110 (5.02) 91 (4.53) 
Total  1,954 (100) 2,265 (100) 2,192 (100) 2,010 (100) 
Note: a. “Always employed” means those who became employed in 2000 (as we dropped individuals who obtained jobs prior to it) for all 
observations, and have stayed in employment throughout the sample time period. There are no “always unemployed” individuals who 
transited in unemployment in 2005 (as we dropped individuals who had been unemployed for more than 36 months) and stayed in this 
status throughout the sample period.  
  b. There are no observations following the three transitions as “unemployed->employed->unemployed->employed”.  
 
Table 6 Homogenous treatment effect of the LCL 
Independent variable 
Urban Migrant Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment->employment     
Ln(unemployment duration) -0.443 (0.077)*** -0.020 (0.110) -0.423 (0.121)*** -0.302 (0.097)*** 
Treatment -0.185 (0.065)*** 0.070 (0.120) -0.159 (0.091)*** -0.102 (0.106) 
Log-likelihood -5,125.174 -1,471.281 -2,106.616 -2,060.712 
Employment->unemployment     
Ln(employment duration) 0.863 (0.042)*** 1.207 (0.082)*** 1.064 (0.052)*** 0.593 (0.035)*** 
Treatment 3.148 (0.106)*** 2.389 (0.154)*** 3.031 (0.122)*** 2.667 (0.114)*** 
Log-likelihood -7,481.184 -2,597.376 -5,556.652 -4,978.626 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels separately. 
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Table 7 Unemployment duration-dependent treatment effect of the LCL, by type of workers 
Interval 
Urban    Migrant    
Unemployment 
(1) 
Employment 
(2) 
Wage 
(3) 
Insurance 
(4) 
Unemployment 
(5) 
Employment 
(6) 
Wage 
(7) 
Insurance 
(8) 
Di×1 month -3.286 (1.414)
** -4.545 (2.313)* 2.789 (1.153)** 2.080 (1.849) -7.583 (3.297)** -17.946 (8.596)** -4.265 (1.672)** 1.163 (0.700)* 
Di×2 months -1.166 (3.170) -3.019 (1.011)
*** 1.926 (1.110)* 2.186 (1.485) -0.747 (0.841) -19.020 (10.201)* -3.676 (2.176)* 0.979 (0.677) 
Di×3 months -1.517 (3.746) 3.965 (2.488) 1.108 (1.531) 1.997 (2.044) -0.806 (1.346) 2.829 ( - ) -2.697 (2.506) 1.166 (0.618)
* 
Di×4 months 2.743 (3.065) 0.955 (2.652) 1.621 (1.234) 1.237 (1.636) -1.632 (1.257) 0.619 ( - ) 4.446 (3.680) 1.220 (0.685)
* 
Di×5 months 2.364 (3.164) 4.443 (2.703)
* 2.606 (1.508)* 1.599 (1.673) 1.527 (1.694) 0.218 ( - ) -3.480 (2.386) 2.011 (0.964)** 
Di×6 months 2.287 (3.960) 1.931 (2.372) 1.576 (1.464) 1.550 (1.797) 2.021 (2.449) 2.483 ( - ) -8.896 (15.860) 1.382 (0.617)
** 
Di×7 months -1.026 (3.005) -5.843 (13.310) -8.438 ( - ) 1.744 (1.644) - - - - 
Di×8 months -1.598 ( - ) - - - - - - - 
Di×9 months 1.872 (3.197) 0.115 ( - ) 3.723 (3.140) - - - - - 
Di×10 months 2.368 (4.149) 3.453 ( - ) 10.197 (59.504) -2.930 (1.706)
* 1.751 (4.314) 0.024 ( - ) -0.517 (236.678) -1.167 (1.102) 
Di×11 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×12 months 2.416 (3.667) 0.076 ( - ) 3.604 (3.246) -2.459 (1.762) 2.026 (2.013) -24.812 (8.982) -9.063 (38.758) -0.649 (0.806) 
Di×13 months 2.855 (3.047) 3.385 ( - ) 1.721 (4.129) -2.669 (1.493)
* 1.765 (2.056) 0.821 ( - ) -4.422 (5.449) -0.807 (0.948) 
Di×14 months 3.314 (4.366) 0.076 ( - ) -6.487 ( - ) - - - - - 
Di×15 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×16 months -1.063 (35.237) 0.525 ( - ) 1.128 (4.317) - - - - - 
Di×17 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×18 months -2.024 (1.775) 0.386 ( - ) 8.626 (12.472) -1.222 (1.705) - - - - 
Di×19 months 2.329 (2.837) -2.921 (12.725) 2.678 (3.491) -2.325 (1.977) - - - - 
Di×20 months 3.109 (3.103) 0.610 ( - ) 1.359 (3.672) -2.140 (1.575) - - - - 
Di×21 months 2.828 (3.677) -1.102 ( - ) 2.713 (3.217) -1.458 (1.630) - - - - 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels separately. “ - “ means no estimator. Each one of the intervals 1-18 represents 1 month in elapsed 
unemployment and the each one of the remaining intervals represent 6 months in elapsed unemployment. 
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Table 8 Unemployment duration-dependent treatment effect of the LCL, by gender 
Interval 
Male    Female    
Unemployment 
(1) 
Employment 
(2) 
Wage 
(3) 
Insurance 
(4) 
Unemployment 
(5) 
Employment 
(6) 
Wage 
(7) 
Insurance 
(8) 
Di×1 month -10.096 (4.065)
** -3.773 (1.063)*** 5.708 (2.118)*** 1.116 (0.837) -4.925 (2.618)* -5.087 (2.558)** -0.423 (0.319) 0.250 (0.276) 
Di×2 months -1.645 (1.321)
 -4.117 (1.189)*** 3.695 (2.077)* 0.827 (0.795) 1.762 (1.384) -5.321 (2.082)* -0.321 (0.375) 0.256 (0.272) 
Di×3 months -1.656 (3.047) -1.262 ( - ) 4.408 (4.125) 1.056 (0.833) -2.027 (3.194) 4.010 ( - ) -1.849 (1.679) 0.588 (0.364) 
Di×4 months 2.382 (3.460) -0.012 ( - ) 3.203 (3.055) 0.678 (0.964) -1.932 (4.122) 3.109 ( - ) -0.661 (1.729) -0.122 (0.286) 
Di×5 months -1.544 (3.413) -0.945 ( - ) -9.492 ( - ) 1.893 (1.109)
* -2.404 (3.469) 3.968 ( - ) 0.819 (1.906) 0.469 (0.343) 
Di×6 months 1.978 (4.549) -0.205 ( - ) 3.917 (3.721) 0.794 (0.887) 1.659 (3.347) 5.302 ( - ) -1.137 (1.275) 0.025 (0.360) 
Di×7 months - - - - 1.358 (3.652) -7.101 (8.765) -10.600 ( - ) -0.246 (0.296) 
Di×8 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×9 months - - - - 1.693 (3.355) -0.171 ( - ) 10.043 ( - ) - 
Di×10 months 2.626 (4.031) -0.227 ( - ) 5.362 (4.528) 1.510 (1.210) - - - - 
Di×11 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×12 months 3.046 (3.253) -31.251 ( - ) 4.514 (4.143) 0.895 (1.080)
 2.014 (3.552) 1.726 ( - ) -0.611 (2.241) 0.448 (1.149) 
Di×13 months 2.899 (3.976) 1.351 ( - ) 5.322 (3.807) 1.829 (1.042)
* 1.811 (3.289) 3.925 ( - ) -1.711 (1.586) 0.111 (0.126) 
Di×14 months 3.064 (6.147) -1.619 ( - ) -2.918 ( - ) - - - - - 
Di×15 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×16 months - - - - -3.822 (5.826) 1.574 ( - ) -2.525 (4.451) - 
Di×17 months - - - - - - - - 
Di×18 months - - 16.501 (51.725) - -3.302 (5.849) - 6.833 ( - ) 0.143 (0.108) 
Di×19 months 3.557 (4.630) - 13.360 (43.795) -1.800 (1.111)
 1.474 (4.133) - -1.096 (1.351) 0.088 (0.092) 
Di×20 months 2.990 (4.170) - 3.023 (4.798) -1.543 (0.923)
* 1.742 (3.333) - -11.674 ( - ) - 
Di×21 months 3.278 (4.081) - 6.920 (3.418)
** - 1.402 (3.185) - -9.224 ( - ) 0.599 (0.817) 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels separately. “ - “ means no estimator. Each one of the intervals 1-18 represents 1 month in elapsed 
unemployment and the each one of the remaining intervals represent 6 months in elapsed unemployment. 
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Table 9 Estimation results of other correlates, by type of workers 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels separately. 
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Table 10 Estimation results of other correlates, by gender 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels separately. 
